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The essays in this issue are often generous both in their in-
terpretation of my book and their criticisms of it. I am ex-
tremely grateful to the authors for taking the time to work
through a long and complex manuscript and for throwing
enormous light on it. Rather than responding to particular ob-
jections raised in these papers, I take this opportunity to set out
the major themes of the book, the motivation for them, and the
aspiration that ties the work together.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s I wrote a series of papers
critical of the economic analysis of law on two fronts-one ana-
lytic, the other normative. First, I showed that the notion of
efficiency used in the literature was ambiguous and that in fact
the dominant notion was neither Pareto-optimality nor Pareto-
superiority, but Kaldor-Hicks. Kaldor-Hicks is problematic for
a variety of reasons, the most important of which is that it is
intransitive. I am grateful for the fact that the current literature
more often than not owns up to its use of the Kaldor-Hicks
formulation of efficiency, even if it does not own up as readily
to the technical problems with it.
In addition to attempting to clarify the concept of efficiency
and to articulating its logical structure, I criticized various
claims made on behalf of its normative attractiveness. I argued
against both the classical theory that efficiency could be de-
fended on utilitarian grounds and Posner's claim that it could
be defended on what he thought of as Kantian or deontological
grounds.
Since no honest academic really believes that his work will
make much of an impact on the course of a discipline, I have
often been gratified and alternately disturbed by the effect of
these essays. While advocates of law and economics, like Guido
Calabresi, have taken my work to have shown the "pointless-
ness of Pareto," 1 some critics of economic analysis have used
my arguments to reject the entire enterprise. This disturbs me
because I never felt my argument supported such a strong con-
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clusion. I always took these articles to be "friendly," even if
severely critical.
Most lawyer-economists have accepted neither Calabresi's
conclusion that Pareto is pointless nor the stronger interpreta-
tion that economic analysis is indefensible. Still, it is fair to say
that most foundationally-minded proponents of economic anal-
ysis have acknowledged the force of my arguments while at the
same time viewing themselves as fully justified in ignoring
them. Perhaps this is because the most serious objections I
have previously raised were to .the normative dimensions of
economic analysis, whereas most economists and lawyer-econ-
omists are concerned primarily with the explanatory and
predictive dimensions of efficiency. This response is under-
standable, but unpersuasive.
We can distinguish between normative and positive social
science. Positive social science is concerned primarily with ex-
planation and prediction. When logical positivism reigned
supreme in the social and natural sciences, it was commonly
thought that explanation and prediction were structurally con-
nected. This is best seen in the work of Hempel and Oppen-
heim, who argued that nothing could count as an explanation
of an event ex post if it could not have -constituted an accurate
and justified prediction of that event ex ante. Explanation and
prediction have the same logical form; what differs is the tem-
poral dimension.
Philosophers of the social and natural sciences no longer
cling to this account of the relationship between explanation
and prediction. The standard view is that a theory can have pre-
dictive value whether or not it serves as an explanation of a
social practice or natural phenomenon. This may well be true
of law, and true of the economic account of law in particular. If
we assume that agents are utility maximizers, it might well be
possible to predict a range of behavior. Under certain condi-
tions, rational agents so conceived will settle disputes rather
than fully litigate them, individuals and manufacturers will in-
vest in certain levels of safety, and so on. But law is more than
the summary of the behavior of relevant individuals. Law is
normative in two important ways. First, to say that law is nor-
mative is to say that it provides the relevant individuals with
reasons or grounds for their actions, in the sense that the mere
fact that a norm is law gives an agent a reason for acting (in
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compliance with it). Second, law involves the exercise of coer-
cive authority. Coercion itself requires a justification.
Understanding law requires giving an account of its norma-
tivity. Efficiency cannot help us to understand law if efficiency
has no normative dimension or foundation. That is why it is not
enough for advocates of economic analysis to be content with
ignoring the arguments I and others have advanced against
them. If efficiency is not something of value, how can the coer-
cive authority of the state be justifiably imposed to promote or
secure it? How would pursuing efficiency honor the practice of
adjudication? Why would anyone have an intrinsic reason for
acting in compliance with it? And so on.
If the goal of economic analysis is predictive only, it does not
matter whether efficiency has a normative grounding or, if it
does, whether that grounding is itself defensible. All that mat-
ters is its capacity to predict. But prediction is not the same
thing as explanation. And economic analysis that is only a pre-
dictive tool contributes nothing to an understanding of our
practices, practices that are essentially normative. Indeed, one
could argue that, understood in this way, economic analysis
simply alienates us from our practices.
Even when I wrote articles critical of economic analysis, I be-
lieved that the economist or lawyer-economist could do better.
In the mid-1980s, I took up the task of seeing if I could do
better on the economist's behalf. Whereas I did not believe
that defenders of economic analysis had presented a compel-
ling defense of efficiency's normativity, I believed that such a
defense was possible. I started a manuscript, entitled The
Market Paradigm, the purpose of which was to provide that
defense.
Instead of arguing that the pursuit of efficiency could be de-
fended on classical utilitarian grounds or on Kantian grounds, I
developed the idea that economic analysis could fall out of a
general political philosophy I called rational choice contractari-
anism. Rational choice contractarianism has its roots in Hob-
bes. In turn, rational choice contractarianism would fall out of a
general reductionist approach to the social and moral sciences
I called the market paradigm.
The market paradigm begins with two primitives. The first is
the principle of individual rationality. The second is the per-
fectly competitive market as the idealized embodiment of indi-
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vidual rationality. The basic idea is this: Norms provide reasons
for acting. Many of the interesting norms in the social sciences,
including legal and moral ones, impose constraints. Con-
straints are limitations on the extent to which individuals can
act on the basis of their rational self-interested motivation. But
if we assume that agents are motivated only by rational reason
(primitive 1), then the norms that constrain that motivation can
be acceptable to them only if they are rational for them. Only
rationality can constrain rationality.
Under what conditions, if any, does rationality counsel con-
straint on rationality? My view is that we should answer this
question by first answering another: Are there any conditions
under which it is not rational to constrain one's rationality? If
there are, then it will be rational to constrain one's rationality
when those conditions are not met.
In fact, it is not rational to constrain one's rationality under
conditions of perfect competition (primitive 2). Under these
conditions, each agent acting in a purely self-interested way
does as well as he might given the welfare of others. Any indi-
vidual, therefore, who imposes constraints or limitations on his
self-interested behavior must do less well for himself than if he
had not so constrained himself. Under these conditions, con-
straint is not rational for individuals. It follows that constraints
are rational only if the conditions of perfect competition are
not met. Constraint is rational if it is a response to market
failure.
Law is a set of constraints on individually utility-maximizing
behavior. Law is rational only under conditions of market fail-
ure. Thus, the best way to understand law is to see it as a re-
sponse to the generic problem of market failure. In addition,
law is a set of constraints imposed on all those individuals
within its domain of operation. Its justification depends on its
being rational for each of them (ex ante). Thus, legal authority is
justified provided it could have been agreed to by those indi-
viduals against whom the authority is exercised. Law represents
a rational (but hypothetical) contract among them. Thus law
and economics falls out of a form of rational choice contractari-
anism that itself falls out of the market paradigm, which we
have identified with the two primitives of rationality and the
market.
Part I of Risks and Wrongs develops but ultimately rejects the
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market paradigm. In particular, it rejects the second primitive,
namely the perfectly competitive market as the analytic and
normative point of departure for our understanding of cooper-
ative interaction, including law. Schemes of mutually imposed
constraints are schemes of rational cooperation. In the market
paradigm, cooperation is rational as a response to failed com-
petition. Against this analysis, Part I argues that the market is
itself a scheme of cooperation and, more generally, that com-
petition presupposes cooperation. Thus, it rejects the idea that
all cooperative schemes, including legal ones, are best under-
stood as responses to market failure.
Part I does not abandon the possibility of presenting a de-
fense of economic analysis, however. Indeed, it accepts both
the principle of rationality and the centrality of the market. It
gives a different understanding of the rationality of the market
and of its place in liberal political theory, however. The basic
idea is this: Markets allow individuals to interact with one an-
other over a specified domain without those individuals first
having either to share a conception of the good, or what is
good in life, or to openly express and resolve their differences
on these matters. Markets raise but do not require resolution of
fundamental value differences. This property of markets is es-
pecially valuable in large, heterogenous, liberal cultures like
our own, or so I argue.
It is a property of markets that is important, moreover, be-
cause of the contribution it makes to social stability. The underly-
ing consensus that binds us together in liberal cultures is both
difficult to secure and fragile. Allocation decisions that require
us constantly to confront the extent of that consensus strain it
unduly. Markets allow us to finesse those questions over
whatever domain they range.
In the market paradigm, law and morality are solutions to
market failure. In the alternative view I develop, law and moral-
ity give effect to value commitments not expressed through
markets. In political and moral debate, a community asks itself
what ought to be allocated through markets, what the distribu-
tion of holdings ought to be, and so on. Such debate provides
the framework through which the community uncovers its iden-
tity. Rather than seeking to promote efficient allocations of re-
sources when markets cannot, the law, morality, and political
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discussion provide us with the opportunity to give voice to fun-
damental values that markets are poorly suited to express.
I call my account of the market "rational choice liberalism."
Like the market paradigm, it is committed to the principle of
rationality and to the market. Unlike the market paradigm, ra-
tional choice liberalism does not take the market as an analytic
point of departure in terms of which social cooperation is to be
explained. Rather, it takes the market as a form of cooperation,
rational under circumstances likely to arise in liberal cultures
like our own.
The market paradigm promised a defense of economic analy-
sis in the sense that law would be understood as a scheme of
rational cooperation for mutual advantage, the point of which
is to secure efficiency when markets cannot. Rational choice lib-
eralism does not promise a defense of efficiency as an in-
dependent moral ideal or value. Indeed, I argue against the
claim that it does. Instead, rational choice liberalism defends
the importance of markets, not efficiency. So, the kind of eco-
nomic analysis I favor emphasizes the importance of markets in
liberalism, and in doing so it downplays both efficiency and lib-
ertarian accounts of the market.
Suppose I am right that markets are important to the liberal
because of the contribution they make to social stability under
circumstances likely to arise in modem, liberal political democ-
racies. Markets are important, however, precisely where they
are most difficult to create and sustain: under conditions in
which individuals have very different values, and where interac-
tions among them are one-dimensional and non-repeating.
Market transactions or exchanges can be viewed as local coop-
eration problems. Under these conditions, cooperation is diffi-
cult. Individuals with vastly different values will have
considerable difficulty in determining whether cooperation can
be mutually beneficial. Formally, we might say that they will
have difficulty identifying the contract curve or its location.
Moreover, strangers are not in a position to rely on reputation
effects to insure compliance with whatever agreements they
reach, and so on.
Suppose markets are sets of discrete, local cooperation
problems. Uncertainty makes markets desirable, but it also
makes market interactions difficult. Whereas we reject the idea
derived from the market paradigm that law serves to promote
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efficient outcomes, we accept the alternative hypothesis that at
least some parts of the law can be understood in the light of the
role they play in creating and sustaining markets-that is, in
solving local cooperation problems. If exchanges are primarily
threatened by uncertainty, then these parts of the law can be
understood in light of the role they play in reducing uncer-
tainty. That is precisely the approach to contract law that I take
up in Part II of the book.
The central idea in Part II is that markets are sets of local
cooperation problems. A local cooperation problem can be
modeled (heuristically) as a bargaining problem embedded in a
Prisoner's Dilemma. There are three aspects of rational coop-
eration expressed in the model: coordination, division, and
compliance. The parties must first determine whether there are
gains to be had; then they must divide the gains; then they must
enforce their understanding or agreement. On the other hand,
it makes no sense for them to bargain over the terms if compli-
ance is not forthcoming. Uncertainty regarding all three ele-
ments of the problem makes its resolution difficult. The claim
is that various contractual norms can best be understood in
light of the role they play in reducing the relevant sort of un-
certainty. In this regard, I discuss both disclosure and default
provisions in contracts.
Let me say a word about default provisions. Contracts are
invariably incomplete. We can distinguish between two differ-
ent kinds of rules for filling in the blanks. The first are gap fill-
ing rules that a court might impose ex post in the event some
contingency arises for which the parties have made no provi-
sion. Default rules are background norms that apply to the
parties unless they contract around them. In the book, I give
both default and gap filling rules the same kind of analytic
treatment.
When the parties have not explicitly allocated risk ex ante, it is
reasonable to ask what allocation should be imposed upon
them ex post. Some might argue for the view that courts should
allocate costs fairly, using the occasion provided by the silence
of the parties as an opportunity to do justice. Others may feel
that the courts should take the opportunity to encourage future
parties to reveal information that will help in their negotiations.
In the view presented in Part II, legal norms are transaction
resources on which the parties can draw when their supply of
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endogenous resources has run down. These exogenous norms
are used to conserve endogenous transaction resources. Thus,
default and gap-filling rules should serve this function. They
will if they impose those rights and responsibilities on the par-
ties to which the parties themselves would have agreed ex ante.
Uncertainty is a transaction cost. Sometimes transaction
costs are sufficiently high to prevent individuals from complet-
ing or fully specifying a contract. Other times transaction costs
are so high they prevent individuals from entering into contrac-
tual relations altogether. Transaction costs can keep us stran-
gers. Contract law helps allocate risk among non-strangers.
What part of the law allocates risks among strangers? What
principle for allocating risk should apply among them?
Tort law allocates risks among strangers. Tort law is simply a
default rule writ large. Instead of completing a contract be-
tween parties, tort law writes a contract among individuals who
are not in a contracting position. But what contract? The an-
swer is simple. The norms of tort law should be those to which
the parties would have agreed ex ante. Such a contract, given the
assumed rationality of the parties, would be efficient. Thus, we
have the economic theory of torts.
In Part III, I consider, but do not advance an entirely eco-
nomic theory of torts. I do not deny that the economic ap-
proach will illuminate aspects of tort law. Indeed, I defend such
a view of products liability law. The rational choice liberal posi-
tion I defend in Part I invites us to see certain parts of the law
in terms of the roles they play in creating and sustaining mar-
kets. But I deny that tort law is central to that objective. It allo-
cates costs among strangers. It does not help parties solve a
local cooperation problem. Thus, I look to other liberal ideals
in understanding tort law. The view I advance in Part III is that
tort law implements the principle of corrective justice.
I contrast my conception of corrective justice with those put
forth by Ernest Weinrib, Richard Epstein, and George Fletcher
as well as with a conception of corrective justice that I have
previously advanced.2 I call my earlier view the annulment the-
sis. In the annulment thesis, corrective justice requires annul-
ling wrongful gains and losses. I now reject this view. In its
2. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. LJ.
(forthcoming 1992).
644 [Vol. 15
HeinOnline  -- 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 644 1992
Risks and Wrongs
place I defend the view that corrective justice imposes a duty to
repair the wrongful losses for which one is responsible.
The difference between the annulment view and the new
view, which I call the mixed view, has to do with the kinds of
reasons for acting that corrective justice gives. In the annul-
ment view, wrongful losses ought to be annulled, but corrective
justice appears to give no person an agent-relative reason for
acting. It appears that no one in particular has a duty to repair
the loss. The mixed view argues that part of what is distinctive
about corrective justice is that it gives rise to agent-relative rea-
sons for acting.
In Part III, I develop an account of "wrongful loss" and "re-
sponsibility" implicated by the principle of corrective justice.
Because corrective justice imposes a duty to repair on those
individuals who have wronged or wrongfully injured others, it
has the effect of sustaining or protecting some underlying set
of norms. Which norms can be sustained or protected by cor-
rective justice? Must those norms express or implement the de-
mands of distributive justice? If so, does that make corrective
justice merely an ancillary principle of distributive justice?
I argue against the idea that corrective justice must be
layered on norms that implement distributive justice. I also ar-
gue that corrective justice can be layered on norms that are effi-
cient. Corrective justice is compatible with an economic theory
of wrongdoing or wrong. On the other hand, my view is that
the norms on which corrective justice is layered are neither just
nor efficient-at least not necessarily. The view I advance is
that corrective justice is layered on norms or conventions that
emerge in various communities as ways of giving expression at
the local level to the general norm of reasonable risk-taking.
These norms are not necessarily absolutely just nor are they
necessarily efficient in the narrow sense. They are norms that
arise in various circumstances for the purposes of coordinating
interaction among individuals. The law does not find efficient
or just norms and then reinforce them by a practice of correc-
tive justice. Rather, it finds norms, already existing in a commu-
nity, which coordinate behavior among members of the
community. Often these norms will have efficiency properties.
It is unlikely, after all, that such norms could arise if they made
individuals worse off than they were before. But the norms
need not be welfare-maximizing; they need not be the best or
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most efficient norms in order to serve their coordinating func-
tions. Similarly, the norms sustained by corrective justice are
likely to be reasonably fair, especially if they are to endure
within a community of equals. But it is neither their fairness
nor their efficiency that gives rise to the moral duty to repair
departures from them, or so I argue.
In my view, the conventional nature of corrective justice is
the most striking and controversial feature of the argument in
Part III. The most controversial claim I defend, however, is the
following, related one: Corrective justice is a norm that links
agents with wrongful losses. It gives agents who are responsi-
ble for the losses a reason for acting in the form of a duty to
repair. That relationship between agents and wrongful losses
can be severed, or replaced by other practices. Suppose we
adopted a social insurance scheme of the sort in place in New
Zealand. That plan gives rise to agent-neutral reasons for act-
ing. We might say that such a plan replaces the agent-relative
reasons for acting under corrective justice, or we might say that
when such a plan is in effect there are no duties in corrective
justice. Indeed, that is the view I advance. Whether or not cor-
rective justice imposes moral duties in a particular community
depends, in my view, on the existence of other social or legal
practices. My view, then, is that in a New Zealand-like situation
corrective justice imposes no moral duty to repairl Whereas
standard legal theory presupposes that a just legal system en-
forces rights and responsibilities derived from moral principles
whose status is independent of law, I argue for the very differ-
ent thesis that the status of corrective justice is not necessarily
independent of legal or other relevant social practices. In other
words, legal practices can affect the existence and scope of
moral principles.
The corrective justice account of tort law embodies liberal
ideals of autonomy and responsibility as well as concern for in-
dividual well-being. The economic account of contract embod-
ies the liberal ideal of stability. Is there a connection between
these liberal ideals that might unify the argument of the book
or must we accept the idea that different parts of the law are
animated by entirely different (if not incompatible) liberal ide-
als? When I first began this project, I had no preconceived
ideas about whether its various component parts were con-
nected by a unified political theory. On the other hand, I did
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not believe that they were incompatible. One could plausibly
argue that the emphasis on stability in Parts I and II seems
Hobbesian, whereas the emphasis on autonomy and responsi-
bility in Part III seems Kantian. Indeed, Jean Hampton argues
in her contribution to this issue that I am more Kantian than
Hobbesian.3 In contrast, David Gauthier fights the Hobbesian
battle for my soul.4 Both see a tension in the underlying polit-
ical theory expressed in the book, either explicitly in Parts I and
II, or implicitly in Part III. Largely as a consequence of their
papers, I have had to rethink my underlying political
commitments.
The last chapter of the book takes up this question. My cur-'
rent thinking is that I am neither Hobbesian nor Kantian. I see
this enterprise as more Humean in spirit and commitment than
anything else. Setting aside the more abstract question about
the spirit of the book, the issue I take up in Chapter 21 is the
relationship among the Parts of the book. What I have to say
there is merely preliminary, however. In the theory developed
in Part I, rational choice liberalism is not a political philosophy
itself. Rather, it is part of a liberal political theory. It is part of a
theory that feels bound by the principle of rationality and the
centrality of the market. It is an alternative to the market para-
digm. The difference is that the market paradigm is committed
to nothing else but rationality and the market. Rational choice
liberalism says in effect that even with the rational choice
framework there is a different place for the market than that
provided by the market paradigm. The market is a scheme of
cooperation-cooperation by competition-that is suitable
under a broad range of empirical circumstances likely to arise
in liberal cultures. It is a scheme of cooperation that is rational,
and it is rational because of the contribution it makes to social
stability.
But stability is not an end in itself. Individuals have projects,
plans, and goals. These provide them with reasons for acting.
Formulating and executing these plans requires stable
frameworks of choice and action. Stability is important because
of its contribution to autonomy, that same principle of auton-
omy that animates the practice of corrective justice. Thus,
3. See Jean Hampton, Rational Choice and The Law, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 649
(1992).
4. See David Gauthier, Jules and the Tortist, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 683 (1992).
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rather than being in tension with one another, the various parts
of Risks and Wrongs stand together as a whole, although my ef-
forts in the book to draw the picture that unites them are
sketchy at best.
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